The Chair, the Needle, and the Damage Done: What the Electric Chair and the Rebirth of the Method-of-Execution Challenge Could Mean for the Future of the Eighth Amendment by Kearns, Timothy S.
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 15
Issue 1 Fall 2005 Article 5
The Chair, the Needle, and the Damage Done:
What the Electric Chair and the Rebirth of the
Method-of-Execution Challenge Could Mean for
the Future of the Eighth Amendment
Timothy S. Kearns
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kearns, Timothy S. (2005) "The Chair, the Needle, and the Damage Done: What the Electric Chair and the Rebirth of the Method-of-
Execution Challenge Could Mean for the Future of the Eighth Amendment," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 15: Iss. 1,
Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol15/iss1/5
THE CHAIR, THE NEEDLE, AND THE DAMAGE
DONE: WHAT THE ELECTRIC CHAIR AND THE
REBIRTH OF THE METHOD-OF-EXECUTION
CHALLENGE COULD MEAN FOR THE FUTURE
OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Timothy S. Kearnst
INTRODUCTION ............................................. 197
I. THE ELECTROCUTION CASES ....................... 201
A. THE KEMMLER DECISION ............................ 201
B. THE KEMMLER EXECUTION ........................... 202
C. FROM IN RE KMMLER to "Evolving Standards" ..... 204
II. THE LOWER COURTS ................................ 206
A. THE CIRCUIT COURTS ................................. 206
B. THE STATE COURTS .................................. 211
C. NEBRASKA - THE LAST HOLDOUT ................... 214
III. WHAT ARE TODAY'S EVOLVING STANDARDS OF
DECEN CY ? ........................................... 214
A. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ..................... 215
B. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EVOLVING
STANDARDS .......................................... 216
C. FACTUAL CONCERNS .................................. 219
D. WHAT HURDLES REMAIN FOR A TROP-BASED
CHALLENGE? .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . .. ...  222
CONCLUSION ................................................ 225
INTRODUCTION
It was shortly before 9 a.m. Jose Sandoval, Jorge Galindo, and Er-
ick Vela went in shooting as they entered the Norfolk, Nebraska branch
of U.S. Bank. In forty seconds, five people-four bank tellers and a
customer-had been shot in the head and killed.1 "It went to hell in the
bank," one of the bank robbers later said.2 The state declared a state of
emergency and used roadblocks and a Black Hawk helicopter to appre-
t J.D. expected 2006, Cornell Law School; B.A. 2003, Iowa State University. The au-
thor would like to thank James Freda for his valuable comments.
1 4th Man Nabbed in Deadly Bank Heist, CBS NEWS (2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2002/09/27inational/main523559.shtml [hereinafter Heist].
2 Bank Robbery Suspect: "It went to hell. " CNN.coM (2002), http://archives.cnn.com/
2002/US/Central/09/27/bank.slayings.
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hend the robbers and their getaway driver.3 The reaction was the same
throughout the American Heartland-the town of Norfolk is simply not
supposed to make national news, at least not since native son Johnny
Carson left The Tonight Show.
This was the deadliest bank heist in a decade. Presently, it is slated
to claim at least two more lives, those of Sandoval and Galindo.4 While
some death penalty proponents will periodically find sympathy for those
facing execution, they will probably remain silent for these men, who
have showed little remorse for their offenses. Nonetheless, these men
are entitled to the protections of the Eighth Amendment, even if the
strength of these protections is by-and-large unclear. Unlike the guilt of
Galindo and Sandoval, the lawful execution of their sentence is uncer-
tain. The uncertainty arises not because of procedural error or jury mis-
conduct, but because of the method by which his execution must be
carried out under state law 5-the application of 2,450 volts of electricity 6
in the last electric chair which has its use mandated by state law. 7
The electric chair poses questions because of those Eighth Amend-
ment protections that constitutionally bar the infliction of cruel and unu-
sual punishments. In assessing whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual, the Supreme Court has taken a number of methods: assessing
whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense,8 whether a
punishment is per se cruel and unusual, 9 or, in death penalty cases,
whether the method of executing the death sentence is cruel and unu-
sual. 10 This last category, which is termed method-of-execution analy-
3 Heist, supra note 1.
4 State Briefs, LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, Oct. 27, 2005, at B2. Vela was also sentenced to
death. His attorneys contend, however, that he is mentally retarded, so the validity of his
sentence has required further adjudication that is projected to take place in January 2006. Id.
5 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2532 (2004).
6 See COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE - FL., A MONITOR: METHODS OF EXECUTION &
PROTOCOLS, IV. METHODS OF EXECUrION, available at http://www.fcc.state.fl.us/fcc/reports/
monitor/methmon.htmI [hereinafter COMMITTEE].
7 See, e.g., Martha Stoddard, Judge Criticizes Death Penalty: Letter to Lawmakers
Questions Justice of Its Use, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, March 2, 2005, at 1B; Death Penalty
Info. Ctr., Methods of Execution, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
scid=8&did=245.
8 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (holding sentence of 25 years to
life for "third-strike"offense of stealing golf clubs permissible); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (holding death penalty grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for crime
of rape).
9 See Furman v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) ("the punishment of death does not
invariably violate the Constitution"); Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957) ("use of dena-
tionalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment").
10 See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643-44 (2004) (discussing classification of
method-of-execution claims alleging cruelty); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136-137 (hold-
ing purishment of death by shooting to be constitutional).
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sis,II has largely languished at the Supreme Court level, with no cases
directly engaging in method-of-execution analysis in 115 years.
The answers to the questions of cruelty raised by the Nebraska's
electric chair may well determine the scope of the Eighth Amendment
and of the death penalty in the United States. Over two decades ago, the
Supreme Court declined to hear Glass v. Louisiana12 to determine the
constitutionality of the electric chair and, over ten years ago, similarly
avoided a method-of-execution issue as applied to hanging in Campbell
v. Wood. 13 It is apparent that only a case of great prominence could lure
the Court to engage in a method-of-execution analysis under the Eighth
Amendment. More recently, the Supreme Court reversed course from
Penry v. Lynaugh,14 which held that a defendant's mental retardation
served as a mitigating factor and not a categorical preclusion of eligibil-
ity for the death penalty, 15 to conclude in Atkins v. Virginia,16 that the
Eighth Amendment did serve as a per se bar to executing the mentally
retarded, 17 it has become evident that even for a Supreme Court that
generally supports the death penalty, its comfort with that ultimate pun-
ishment is eroding.
The fragile legal foundation for the death penalty is exposed further
by the recent decision in Roper v. Simmons.' 8 In Roper, the Supreme
Court held by a 5-4 margin, that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibited states from subjecting offenders who were under the age of 18
at the time of their capital offense to the death penalty.' 9 Roper has been
strongly criticized20 for its reliance upon international law and result-
1 See id.
12 State v. Glass, 455 So.2d 659 (La. 1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985).
13 20 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994)
14 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
15 Id. at 340.
16 536 U.S. 304 (2003).
17 Id. at 321.
18 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
19 Id. at 578.
20 See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARv. L. REV. 31, 90 ("Strip Roper v. Simmons of its fig leaves-the psychologi-
cal literature that it misused, the global consensus to which it pointed, the national consensus
that it concocted by treating states that have no capital punishment as having decided that
juveniles have a special claim not to be executed (the equivalent of saying that these states had
decided that octogenarians deserve a special immunity from capital punishment)-and you
reveal a naked political judgment."); Charles Babington, Senate Links Violence to "Political"
Decisions: 'Unaccountable' Judiciary Raises Ire, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at A07, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26236-2005Apr4.html; Donald Kochan,
No Longer Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous
Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP.
L. REV. 103, 128 (2005) ("More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the Court's
argument-that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to
be rejected out of hand.").
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oriented manipulation of factors to overturn the recent precedents of
Thompson v. Oklahoma2l and Stanford v. Kentucky.22
Roper is likely to have only a limited impact on the actual number
of executions in the United States because few individuals were sen-
tenced to death for crimes they have committed before the age of eigh-
teen.23 Nonetheless, its collateral impact could be profound. The Roper
decision may well provide a framework for applying the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" holding of Trop v. Dulles24 to method-of-execution
analysis, potentially spelling the end of certain executions based on per-
ceived cruelty of the prescribed method of execution in the state of con-
viction, rather than demography or IQ.
Death by electrocution has become an enigma. This Note argues
that the case against execution by electrocution has reached a crisis.
Even the previously unassailable execution method of lethal injection has
been assaulted by charges of cruelty in Nelson v. Campbell 25 the public-
ity surrounding Michael Ross, who waived his appeals to become the
first person executed in Connecticut since 1960,26 and decisions by the
Eighth Circuit27 and a California district court28 requiring modification
of the execution protocols. While challenging the execution protocol it-
self is not a challenge to the constitutionality of lethal injection, 29 the end
result may well be the same. 30 As a result of the Court's 115 year refusal
to hear method-of-execution cases, there is little or no illustrative prece-
dent to facilitate meaningful understanding of what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.
After Atkins and Roper, the death penalty faces an uncertain future
as it is gradually eroded. However, because demographic assaults like
21 See 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that offenders under the age of 16 at the time of
their capital offense could not be executed).
22 492 U.S. 361,380 (1989) (holding that no "societal consensus" existed to require the
exemption of 16 and 17 year old offenders from the death penalty).
23 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565 (noting that since 1995, only three states had executed
people who were under 18 at the time of their offense); see also 543 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("As for actual executions of under- 18 offenders, they constituted 2.4% of the total
executions since 1973.").
24 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
25 541 U.S. 637 (2004).
26 See Execution in Connecticut: The Laws; One Execution is Unlikely to Hasten Others,
Experts Say, N.Y. TLMES, May 14, 2005, at B4.
27 See Crawford v. Taylor, 126 S.Ct 1192 (2006) (denying motion to vacate stay of
execution granted by the Eighth Circuit); see also Mark Morris, Missouri Asks for Speedy
Resolution: Sides Map Strategies in Taylor's Legal Case, KANSAS Crr STAR, at B I.
28 Morales v. Hickman, 2006 WL 335427, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
29 Id. at *2.
30 See John M. Broder, Questions over Method Lead to Delay of Execution, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2006, at A24 (" 'After this new order came down, the state came back and said they
couldn't comply,' said John Grele, one of Mr. Morales's lawyers. 'They couldn't find anyone
to inject the chemicals to kill him.' ").
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Atkins and Roper seem to be otherwise resolved or too uncertain to be
relied upon by litigating defendants and the other most prominent demo-
graphic decision-McCleskey v. Kemp,31 holding that individual defend-
ants must establish that racial discrimination motivated their death
sentence-is unlikely to be revisited by the current Court, it is minority
methods of execution that will likely elucidate the earliest and most sig-
nificant effects of the Atkins/Roper evolution.
Using Nebraska's electric chair as a point of departure, this Note
assesses the potentiality of an important shift in Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence: a return to method-of-execution analysis. Part I summarizes
the Supreme Court's treatment of the electric chair, from the first electro-
cution case, In re Kemmler,32 to the present. Part II discusses subsequent
case law from the lower courts on electrocution and assesses its infirmi-
ties. Part III demonstrates that "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of maturing society" 33 no longer support execution by
electrocution. The Note concludes with thoughts on what the abolition
of death by electrocution could mean to method-of-execution analysis
and the death penalty in general.
I. THE ELECTROCUTION CASES
A. THE KEMMLER DECISION
William Kemmler was an illiterate vegetable peddler whose murder
of his lover Matilda Ziegler made him the guiding force behind the ma-
jority of American executions for nearly ninety years. 34 It was August 6,
1890, in Auburn, New York, when Kemmler became a historical foot-
note as the first American executed by electrocution. 35 The effect of his
case on the American legal system lingers to this day.
The path of In re Kemmler appears strikingly familiar to those who
have followed the development of death penalty precedent. The Court of
Appeals of New York rejected Kemmler's claim that electrocution was
cruel and unusual and affected a deprivation of his life without due pro-
cess of law, 36 affirming the lower court and denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.37 The decision might have been motivated in part
by celebrities eager to test a miracle of modem science on an available
31 452 U.S. 920 (1987).
32 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
33 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1956).
34 See generally CRAIG BRANDON, THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY
90-105 (1999).
35 Id. at 7.
36 See People ex rel. Kemmnler v. Durston, 24 N.E. 6, 6 (1890).
37 Id. at 9.
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felon,38 Kemimler petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of error,39 ar-
guing that death by electrocution constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 40
Chief Justice Melville Fuller delivered the Court's opinion that a
state's determination that the punishment of electrocution was not cruel
and unusual was not available for Supreme Court review. 41 The Court
embraced the findings of the New York Supreme Court that the evidence
was "'clearly in favor of the conclusion that it is within easy reach of
electrical science at this day to so generate and apply . . . a current of
electricity of such known and sufficient force as certainly to produce
instantaneous, and, therefore, painless, death.' "42
Thus, William Kemmler's date with the electric chair would not be
obstructed by the Constitution. The lack of skepticism by the Supreme
Court is alarming, given the New York Supreme Court's further declara-
tion that "[i]t detracts nothing from the force of the evidence in favor of
this conclusion that we do not know the nature of electricity, nor how it
is transmitted in currents, nor how it operates to destroy the life of ani-
mals and men exposed to its force. '43 Furthermore, the New York Court
of Appeals had demonstrated its own flagrant disregard for even the most
cursory review of prisoner's rights by determining that neither expert nor
lay witness testimony could be introduced to counter the legislative de-
termination that the electric chair was painless. 4 Nonetheless, given that
this was a Supreme Court adjudicating prior to the period of the incorpo-
ration of the Eighth Amendment against the states,45 a more searching
inquiry was unlikely. Moreover, because there had been no previous exe-
cution by electrocution in the world, the factual findings seemed per-
fectly reasonable. Soon enough, however, that certainty would perish
with Kemmler in a cloud of sparks and smoke.
B. THE KEMMLER EXECUTION
It was a little over two months after the Supreme Court's decision
before Kemmler actually faced the electric chair. At 6:32 a.m. on August
38 Among others, Thomas Edison urged the use of electricity for the execution, particu-
larly the alternating current of his rival George Westinghouse's alternating current, to promote
his own direct current. Id. at 7-12.
39 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 438.
40 Id. at 445.
41 See id. at 449.
42 Id. at 443 (quoting People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 818 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1889) (emphasis added)).
43 People ex reL Kemmler v. Durston, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 818.
44 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (citing People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston).
45 The recognized incorporation of the Eighth Amendment took place in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
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6, William Kemmler was led into the execution chamber, clad in a three-
piece SUit,4 6 set to be the first human to die in the electric chair. He was
strapped into the chair, introduced to the spectators at the execution, and
masked. 47 A switch was thrown in an adjacent room, creating a noise
audible in the execution chamber. 48 The first execution by electrocution
had begun.
Upon the first administration of current, Kemmler's fingers ap-
peared to grab the chair and the nail of his right index finger cut through
his palm.4 9 After seventeen seconds, the current-now two thousand
volts-was stopped. 50 Witnesses celebrated Kemmler's apparent death.
One exclaimed, "There is the culmination of ten years' work and study
.... We live in a higher civilization from this day!" 5 1 A doctor's exami-
nation, however, revealed that the cut on Kemmler's hand still dripped
blood, indicating that he was still alive, and the order was given to turn
the current on again. 52 Froth came from Kemmler's mouth while the
voltage in the generator slowly increased, and witnesses heard Kemmler
emitting a "heavy sound" as though he were struggling to breathe. 53
Many witnesses turned away from the ghastly sight, one fled the room,
and another lay on the floor.54 Kemmler's living body waited two min-
utes for the voltage to be administered again.55
At last, the application of current resumed, this time lasting between
70 seconds to four and a half minutes, varying by witness accounts. 56
Smoke rose from Kemmler's body as it sizzled, resulting from a loos-
ened electrode on Kemmler's head, now burning from sparks. 57 The cur-
rent was turned off again, and the state of New York had successfully
killed William Kemmler in eight minutes. 58 Although the doctors agreed
there was not even an "iota of pain," spectators debated the source of the
sounds.59 An autopsy, conducted three hours after the electrocution, re-
vealed that Kemmler's brain was 97°F and had been partly burned. Bums
were also observed along the base of his spine. 60
46 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 173.
47 Id. at 174-75.
48 Id. at 176.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 177.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 178.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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C. FROM IN RE KEMMLER TO "EVOLVING STANDARDS"
The horrors accompanying Kemmler's execution did nothing to
dampen the fervor for electrocution in the United States; by 1915, twelve
states had adopted electrocution as a method of execution. 61 In Malloy v.
South Carolina,62 the next Supreme Court case to engage with electrocu-
tion, the Court considered Joe Malloy's challenge to the change in the
method of his execution as an ex post facto law. 63 Convicted in 1910 of
murder, Malloy's sentence was originally execution by hanging, 64 but
two years later, South Carolina adopted electrocution for all capital
crimes. 65 In dicta, the Court took judicial notice of "well-known facts"
to support the belief that electrocution was more humane than hanging,
while referring mere sentences later to electrocution's humane nature as
a "well-grounded belief."'66 Without examining Kemmler's questionable
factual underpinnings, the Court held that the change did not constitute
an ex post facto law. 67
Thirty-two more years would pass before the Court would give even
tangential consideration to electrocution, in the case of a failed execution
in Louisiana. 68 Once in the electric chair, convicted murderer Willie
Francis received an administration of current that was insufficient to kill
him.69 Louisiana thus sought a second death warrant that would allow
them to attempt a second execution of Francis. The Kemmler decision
largely escaped the Supreme Court's scrutiny unscathed.70 In upholding
the grant of the second warrant, the Court mentioned,"[a]s nothing has
been brought to our attention to suggest the contrary, we must and do
assume that the state officials carried out their duties under the death
warrant in a careful and humane manner. '71 The plurality opinion further
announced that "[t]he Fourteenth [Amendment] would prohibit by its due
process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner. '72 In what would
hardly be the last disregard for the text of In re Kemmler, Justice Reed
noted that "the Kemmler case denied that electrocution infringed the fed-
eral constitutional rights of a convicted criminal sentenced to execu-
61 Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 183.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 181; An Act of Feb. 17, 1912, No. 402, 1912 S.Car. Acts 702.
66 Id. at 185 (citing State v. Tomassi, 69 A. 214 (N.J. 1918) and In re Storti, 60 N.E. 210
(Mass. 1901)).
67 Id. at 184.
68 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
69 Id. at 461.
70 Id. at 464.
71 Id. at 462.
72 Id. at 463.
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tion, ' '73 while obfuscating the lack of individual constitutional rights
under the Eighth Amendment in operation against states. In his concur-
rence, Justice Frankfurter made no mention of Kemmler or Malloy, but
used his concurrence to decry the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to
incorporate the Bill of Rights.74
The dissent approached the case deliberately, explaining that Loui-
siana's statute only authorized electrocution in a form that avoided suf-
fering, and allowed for only one administration of current.75 Strikingly,
Justice Burton noted, "[In Kemmler,] this Court stressed the fact that the
electric current was to cause instantaneous death.., it was the resulting
'instantaneous' and 'painless' death that was referred to as 'humane."' 76
The dissenters read the death penalty statute literally and condemned the
attempt to seek a second warrant because of a failed electrocution, when
"[i]t was the statutory duty of the state officials to make sure that there
was no failure."'77
Willie Francis was strapped into the chair a second time just under
four months after the Supreme Court denied his appeal. 78 His second
execution was successful. 79
Aside from denials of certiorari, 80 the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the electric chair since 1947. Trop v. Dulles,8' the post-Kem-
mler decision that may have the most substantive impact on method-of-
execution analysis, was handed down in 1957. The appellant in Trop, a
native-born U.S. citizen, effectively challenged the rescission of his citi-
zenship as punishment following a court martial for wartime desertion.82
The Court held that rendering a person stateless had no purpose except
for punishing the individual, and the decision of the military tribunal was
thus an application of penal law that was governed by the Eighth Amend-
ment.83 The Court distinguished the death penalty, reasoning that:
73 Id. at 462.
74 Id. at 466-71 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 474-75 (Burton, J., concurring).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 477.
78 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 234-35.
79 Id. at 235.
80 See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
The Court had granted certiorari to a challenge against Florida's frequently malfunctioning
electric chair, see Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999), but dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted once Florida responded by adopting lethal injection as its default
method of execution, see Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000).
81 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
82 Id. at 88.
83 Id. at 97.
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[w]hatever the arguments may be against capital punish-
ment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accom-
plishing the purposes of punishment-and they are
forceful-the death penalty has been employed through-
out our history, and, in a day when it is still widely ac-
cepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty. But it is equally plain that the exis-
tence of the death penalty is not a license to the Govern-
ment to devise any punishment short of death within the
limit of its imagination. 84
The Court described the basis of the Eighth Amendment as "nothing
less than the dignity of man[,] ' 85 and stated, "[tlhis Court has had little
occasion to give precise content to the Eighth Amendment, and, in an
enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not surprising. ' 86 Stateless-
ness, contended the Court, is a punishment more depraved than torture,
and among civilized nations, there is "virtual unanimity" that stateless-
ness is not an available criminal penalty. 87
II. THE LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Trop was somewhat surprising
from a Court that sent a man back to the electric chair just ten years
earlier. Since the Trop holding, the Court has recognized that "the words
of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not
static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. '88 Under
the progressive standards of the "dignity of man" and "evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," coupled
with the Eighth Amendment's application of the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment bar to the states in Robinson v. California,89 it seemed that no
precedent as fragile as In re Kemmiler could withstand scientific discov-
ery and the availability of less haunting forms of execution. American
legal history, however, has told an entirely different story.
A. THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Although the Supreme Court's early Eighth Amendment cases at
least nominally focused on the constitutionality of particular execution
methods, after the progressive standards of Trop were announced, the
84 Id. at 99.
85 Id. at 100.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 101-03.
88 Id. at 100-01.
89 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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Court seemingly turned its back on method-of-execution analysis, in-
stead chipping away instead at death-eligible offenses 90 and demographic
eligibility for the death penalty. 9 1 For over one hundred years, the Su-
preme Court has not addressed whether electrocution constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. 92  Furthermore, the lower federal and state
courts have little guidance from the Supreme Court against which to as-
sess the constitutionality of any method of execution. 93 In place of such
precedent, courts have largely relied upon In re Kemmler.94 The out-
comes, as a result, are often alarming.
Although the Fourth Circuit is the only federal circuit court to rec-
ognize openly that Kemmler is hardly conclusive, it nonetheless contin-
ues to rely upon it.95 The Fourth Circuit heard a method of execution
challenge as part of Poyner v. Murray,96 and rejected it, saying that "if
narrowly read," Kemmler did not stand as precedent for the constitution-
ality of electrocution as a method of execution.97 Nonetheless, combin-
ing an unholy triumvirate of Kemmler and its progeny, 98 non-merits
determinations,9 9 and dicta,1° ° with a number of poorly construed opin-
ions, 10 the Fourth Circuit held in Poyner that electrocution is not cruel
and unusual.
90 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977).
91 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
92 See Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931, 931 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in denial of
cert).
93 See Roberta M. Harding, The Gallows to the Gurney: Analyzing the
(Un)Constitutionality of Methods of Execution, 6 B.U. Pun. INr'L L.J. 153, 154-55 (1996).
94 See infra notes 95, 98.
95 See Ralph v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 438 F.2d 786, 789 (4th Cir. 1970) ("By
implication the Court has approved the death penalty by stating that shooting and electrocution
are not cruel and unusual forms of execution.")(citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) and
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878)).
96 No. 93-6052, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 38227, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 1993).
97 Id. at *5.
98 Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1155 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that claim is pre-
cluded by Johnson v. Kemp, 759 F.2d 1503 (11 th Cir. 1985)); Wilson v. Butler, 812 F.2d 664
(5th Cir. 1987) (relying on Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978));
Funchess v. Wainwright, 788 F.2d 1443 (11 th Cir. 1986) (relying on Spinkellink, arguing that
precedent forecloses the Eighth Amendment claim with no regard for Trop analysis); Johnson
v. Kemp, 759 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11 th Cir. 1985) (finding contention "frivolous"); Sullivan v.
Dugger, 721 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1983) (relying on Spinkellink); Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978) (relying on In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890)).
99 Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930 (11 th Cir. 1986) (finding that Eighth Amendment
claim was barred because it was not brought up in petitioner's original appeal).
100 Ralph, 438 F.2d 786; Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (noting that
electrocution was permitted by In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), in a case regarding the
constitutionality of the strap and corporal punishment).
101 See Jones v. Whitley, 938 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1991) (arguing that cause and prejudice
test of McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), barred claim of electric chair's cruelty be-
cause "[h]is complaints about the malfunctioning of Louisiana's electric chair do not show that
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Thanks to the frequent malfunctions of Florida's electric chair, the
Fifth Circuit, and now the Eleventh Circuit, have long produced cases
that reproduce the errors of post-Kemmler Eighth Amendment analysis: a
reliance on outdated factual determinations and dicta. The first promi-
nent case was Spinkellink v. Wainwright,10 2 in which the appellate court
rejected the claim, inter alia, that death by electrocution violates the
Eighth Amendment. 10 3 After his failed challenge, Spinkellink became
the first person executed after the Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v.
Georgia.'°4 Since Spinkellink, malfunctions have been frequent in Flor-
ida, with fire shooting from the heads of two men (Jesse Tafero and
Pedro Medina) during their executions 10 5 and one prisoner emerging
from his electrocution with a bloodied head,10 6 that Florida attributed to
an unrelated nosebleed during the execution. 107 Nonetheless, the
Spinkellink decision still shapes the case law of the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits and plays a substantial role in the Fourth Circuit,'0 8even though
it suffers from an all-too-familiar deficiency, a truly heroic reliance on
the dicta and outdated factual determinations of In re Kemmler.
The Circuits varied in their approach, periodically abandoning
Spinkellink entirely, as in Corn v. Zant.1°9 In Corn, the Eleventh Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court precedents of Gregg v. GeorgiaI 10 and
Coker v. Georgia"' to determine that electrocution is constitutional.
Gregg upheld Georgia's death penalty statute, 112 but did not engage in
any method-of-execution analysis. Coker, meanwhile, determined that
the death penalty was grossly excessive punishment for a charge of
rape. 1 3 Then, in Watson v. Blackburn, 114 which was decided two years
it is inoperable or any more inhumane than it ever was when previous constitutional challenges
were rejected."); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (adopting rationale of
district court, 671 F.Supp 423 (E.D. La. 1987), which concluded that Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) adversely determined method-of-execution claim); Watson v. Blackburn, 756
F.2d 1055 (per curiam) (noting that contention is without merit); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549
(1 th Cir. 1983) (relying on two non-method-of-execution determinations to contend that elec-
trocution had been deemed permissible).
102 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978).
103 Id. at 616.
104 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
105 See Jonathan Simon, Book Review: Why Do You Think They Call It CAPITAL Punish-
ment?: Reading the Killing State, 36 LAW AND Soc'y REV. 783, 801 (2002) (discussing
botched electrocutions in Florida).
106 See id; see also Allen Lee "Tiny" Davis, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htmlU
death/US/davis558.htm.
107 See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So.2d 413, 414 (1999).
108 Poyner v. Murray, No. 93-6052, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS at *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 1993).
109 708 F.2d 549, 563 (11th Cir. 1983).
11o 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
111 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
112 428 U.S. at 207.
113 See 433 U.S. at 600.
114 756 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1985).
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after Corn (and seven years after Spinkellink), the Fifth Circuit offered
no further answer to the method-of-execution challenge, except to con-
clude in a footnote that the contention that electrocution constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment is without merit. 115 The Eleventh Circuit em-
ployed a similar approach in Lindsey v. Smith,1 16 wrongly using prece-
dent to bar the claim without citing the proper case. 117
In Wilson v. Butler, 18 the Fifth Circuit rejected an Eighth Amend-
ment claim, declaring:
The petitioner's twelfth contention is that electrocution,
which is Louisiana's method of carrying out a capital
sentence, would inflict wanton and unnecessary torture
and torment upon petitioner. Electrocution as the
method of carrying out a sentence of capital punishment
is constitutional. Petitioner's claim is without merit. 119
The Sixth Circuit was similarly reticent to give the claim a forum.
For instance, in the case of Coe v. Bell, the Sixth Circuit summarily af-
firmed the district court's rejection of Eighth Amendment claims relating
to electrocution. 120 When Ohio changed to lethal injection as the default
method of execution, 121 the Circuit had an easy opportunity to rid them-
selves of the claim, by relying heavily on what could be described as the
"choose or lose" doctrine adopted in Stewart v. LaGrand.122 In Stewart,
the Supreme Court held that petitionier's opportunity to choose a method
of execution other than electrocution barred all Eighth Amendment
claims relating to electrocution.' 23
In 1997, the Sixth Circuit held that the use of a § 1983 action to
challenge an execution method constituted a second or successive habeas
petition. 124 Furthermore, even if the court were to consider such a claim,
it must still be rejected because the "legal bases for such a challenge"
115 Id. at 1058, n.1.
116 820 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1987).
117 Id. at 1155. The court cited Johnson v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1986), a
decision wholly unrelated to the Eighth Amendment. Most likely, the court intended to cite
Johnson v. Kemp, 759 F.2d 1503 (11 th Cir. 1986), but even this case merely noted that the
claim was "frivolous" and gave no substantive reason to bar future claims.
118 813 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1987).
119 Id. at 678 (citation omitted).
120 See 161 F.3d 320, 341-42 (6th Cir. 1998).
121 OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.22 (2003). This statute became effective November 21,
2001. See Cowans v. Bagley, 236 F.Supp.2d 841, 871 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
122 See 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999) (per curiam).
123 Id.; See also Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that choice makes
Eighth Amendment question "unimportant").
124 In re Sapp, 118 F.3d 460, 461 (6th Cir. 1997).
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had been evident for many years, 125 citing Kemmler and the Eleventh
Circuit opinion in Porter v. Wainwright.126 The Sixth Circuit's reliance
on the Eleventh Circuit opinion as substantial precedent for a Sixth Cir-
cuit case is particularly dubious after reading Porter, where the court
merely declares that the Eighth Amendment claim was procedurally
barred and would otherwise have been barred on the merits by Sullivan v.
Dugger.127 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit relied on the ready availabil-
ity of the evidence to dismiss the claim, even if jurisdiction was proper,
noting "[e]ven though, in petitioner's mind, every year or every day may
bring new support for his arguments, the claims themselves have long
been available, and have needlessly and inexcusably been withheld."' 28
Furthermore, the court engages in a sleight-of-hand of sorts to undermine
future method-of-execution claims under the Eighth Amendment, re-
marking "[n]o legislatively authorized method of execution in the United
States is outlawed in any jurisdiction by any currently effective court
decision."' 129 While the statement is accurate, it is somewhat deceptive,
since the earlier decision in Fierro v. Gomez 130 enjoining the use of the
gas chamber, was vacated by the Supreme Court.' 3 ' The Supreme Court
vacated the decision because Fierro had been adopted by California's
legislature, 132 rendering the decision irrelevant unless future generations
revert to the gas chamber as a method of execution.
The Eighth Circuit has employed procedural bars and substantial
judicial discretion in granting evidentiary hearings in resolving Eighth
Amendment claims. As a result, petitioners have consequently been fore-
closed from offering evidence of cruelty in electrocution. For instance,
the court noted in Swindler v. Lockhart133 that a trial court has significant
discretion to grant a continuance for the presentation of evidence. 134
And, in Williams v. Hopkins, 35 the Eight Circuit ruled that a § 1983
action constituted a successive habeas petition and therefore was proce-
durally barred. 136 However, the Court, seemingly ignoring the admoni-
tions of Trop, added that the Eighth Amendment claim was both barred
125 Id. at 464 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Porter v. Wainwright, 805
F.2d 930 (11th Cir. 1986)).
126 Id.
127 Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 942.
128 In re Sapp, 118 F.3d at 464.
129 Id. (citing Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d. 1434 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
130 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
131 See Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(b) (West
Supp. 1996)).
132 See id.
133 885 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1989).
134 Id. at 1350.
135 130 F.3d 333 (8th Cir. 1997).
136 Id. at 336.
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by precedent and frivolous, as no court had ever accepted such an argu-
ment. 137 Two years previously, the court rejected another Eighth
Amendment challenge by the same petitioner on the grounds that he had
raised the issue in his pro se petition to the district court and subse-
quently abandoned it.13 8
B. THE STATE COURTS
Since In re Kemmler, 4,342 men and women have been executed
via electrocution by twenty-six states and the District of Columbia. 139
Appeal after appeal has been held barred by the Kemmler holding or
otherwise dismissed. Each state has developed its own systemic re-
sponse to Eighth Amendment claims, but the ultimate response by states
has clearly favored alternate methods of execution.
In 2001, the first judicial breakthrough occurred when the Georgia
Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision prohibiting electrocution as
cruel and unusual punishment under the Georgia Constitution. 40 The
Court had expressed reservations about electrocution for a number of
years, but generally disposed of the issue on procedural or evidentiary
grounds.' 41 Earlier in the year, the state legislature had enacted an es-
cape provision: if an authoritative court found electrocution to be cruel
and unusual, all executions would take place by lethal injection. 142 The
court remarked that the legislature, in enacting this provision, had found
that there was a consensus that the "science of our day" had discovered
that lethal injection was a less barbarous and painful method of execu-
tion. 143 This of course, represented some irony, given the oft-cited pro-
position that electrocution constituted a genuinely painless death.44
Perhaps more than any other state, Florida's courts have brought to
light the ongoing struggle over the electric chair and have become a
flashpoint for both supporters and opponents of electrocution. Following
the disastrous execution of Pedro Medina, where flames appeared near
the headpiece and smoke rose from the prisoner's head, 145 Florida's
courts were faced with a spate of challenges to its frequently-malfunc-
tioning electric chair. Leo Jones challenged his sentence to die in the
137 Id. at 337. This is no longer true. See infra, Part II, §B.
138 Williams v. Clarke, 40 F.3d 1529, 1533-34 (8th Cir. 1995).
139 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 246; see also DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
METHODS OF EXECUTION, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=245.
140 See Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137 (Ga. 2001). The relevant provision in the Geor-
gia Constitution reads: GA. CONST., art.I, § 1, para. XVII (2005).
141 See Dawson, 554 S.E.2d at 140-41.
142 As amended, see O.C.G.A. §17-10-38 (2005).
143 Dawson, 554 S.E.2d at 144.
144 See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
145 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 2.
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electric chair on the grounds that Florida's electric chair was cruel and
unusual, litigating the issue primarily on the results of the Medina execu-
tion. A lower court rejected Jones' claim, finding that Medina suffered
no "conscious pain" because his brain was "depolarized in milliseconds,"
that the chair was in working order, and that future inmates would suffer
no pain during electrocution. 146 The court openly neglected the dual
standards recognized in Trop-"dignity of man" and "evolving standards
of decency" 147-determining that cruel and unusual punishment required
the "wanton infliction of unnecessary pain." 148 The Supreme Court of
Florida rejected the contention that Florida demonstrated "deliberate in-
difference to their prisoners"' well-being by placing them in the electric
chair, and held it to be completely meritless. 149
In contrast, the dissent contended that, "[t]o meet the requirement
that a punishment not be cruel on its face, a method of execution should
entail no unnecessary violence or mutilation[;]" arguing that without
such a limitation, there existed no clear reason to reject the guillotine as a
method of execution. 150 Justice Leander Shaw reiterated the disasters
accompanying the execution of Jesse Tafero and Pedro Medina and
declared,
[t]he bottom line is inexorable: In two out of eighteen
executions, i.e., in eleven percent of executions, carried
out during this relatively brief period, the condemned
prisoner was engulfed in smoke, flames, and the odor of
burning material-which some observers described as
the stench of burning or roasting flesh-when the switch
was pulled.151
The dissent compared electrocution executions to the guillotine or
burning at the stake, but the rhetoric did not carry the day. On the basis
of a 4-3 decision, maintained only by a special concurrence by Justice
Major B. Harding, noting that "[p]erhaps Florida's legislature should
consider [lethal injection]"' 152 and invoking Fierro v. Gomez, 153 Jones
was sent to die in Florida's electric chair.
Two years and one more headline-grabbing botched execution later,
the Florida Supreme Court again reviewed the constitutionality of the
electric chair.154  The Supreme Court accepted the factual determina-
146 See Jones v. Butterworth, 701 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. 1997).
147 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
148 Jones, 701 So.2d at 77-78.
149 Id. at 79.
150 Jones, 701 So.2d at 84. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 87 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 80-81.
153 77 F.3d 301 (9th. Cir. 1996).
154 Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1999).
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tions of the lower court that Allen Lee Davis suffered an instantaneous
and painless death and that the mouth straps may have caused discom-
fort-but not severe and wanton pain. 55 This time, however, the court
admitted that electrocution "may involve some degree of pain[.' 1 56
Again, the justices lined up as they did in Jones and sent Thomas
Provenzano to the electric chair by a single vote. 5 7 Newly-elevated
Chief Justice Harding again joined the 4-3 majority and wrote a special
concurrence: "I urge the Legislature to revisit this issue and pass legisla-
tion giving death row inmates the choice between lethal injection and
electrocution as the method of carrying out the death penalty."' 58 Justice
Peggy Quince also added a special concurrence, and remarked that the
real question underlying the case is whether electrocution is appropriate
under the "evolving standards" doctrine of Trop.159
Justice Shaw dissented again, this time emphasizing that despite
Florida's attempt to utilize Jones v. Butterworth as barring precedent, the
Court had never addressed the per se constitutionality of the electric
chair.' 60 Shaw observed the vast number of cases where the electric
chair's constitutionality was accepted without serious reflection, noting
eight different cases in which the Court held the issue procedurally
barred or meritless. 61 He commented on the inappropriate reliance on
Kemmler that had shaped 109 years of electrocutions, "[tjhat case is still
the seminal case in this field and, contrary to popular belief, does not
stand for the proposition that electrocution is per se lawful ad infinitum if
there is no pain."' 62 Shaw closed, adding that the Humane Society of the
United States and the American Veterinarian Medical Association had
both condemned the use of electrocution as a method of euthanasia for
pets and that even Florida's Corrections Commission had recommended
that lethal injection be adopted. 163 In 2000, the Florida legislature
amended FLA. STAT. § 922.105 to make lethal injection the default
method of execution unless the condemned person affirmatively chooses
electrocution. 164
155 Id. at 414.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 416.
158 Id. at 416-17 (Harding, C.J., specially concurring).
159 Id. at 420 (Quince, J., specially concurring).
160 Id. at 424 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 425 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 426 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 436-37 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
164 See FLA. STAT. § 922.105 (as amended 2000).
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C. NEBRASKA - THE LAST HOLDOUT
Nebraska's state courts have been among the least receptive to argu-
ments against the constitutionality of the electric chair. In 1967, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court rejected to an Eighth Amendment claim in State v.
Alvarez, holding "electrocution as punishment for crime is not a cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the state and federal Con-
stitutions[.]J " 65 It cited only In Re Kemmler and Malloy v. South Caro-
lina as binding precedent. 166 When the claim was raised again twenty-
eight years later in State v. Ryan, 167 the response of the state's highest
court was suspiciously familiar. The court held that Alvarez con-
trolled. 168 In 2000, with only Nebraska, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia
on the list of states which practiced electrocution as a mandatory execu-
tion practice, the response was the same, citing Ryan as the controlling
precedent. 169 In 2005, the Nebraska Supreme Court was faced with an-
other challenge to electrocution as cruel and unusual, but did not address
the issue because the petitioner was to be resentenced, and thus, did not
necessarily face the death penalty.' 70 The court commented that "recent
events ... may cast doubt upon whether [the U.S. Supreme] Court will
continue to regard electrocution as consistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment."' 17 1 Nonetheless, there has been no indication that the Nebraska
Supreme Court would play any role in eliminating the electric chair.
III. WHAT ARE TODAY'S EVOLVING STANDARDS
OF DECENCY?
In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court assessed "evolving standards
of decency," by relying upon a number of factors, including international
authorities 172 and the legislative actions of the states. 173 In answering the
related question of excessiveness, the Court has also considered the sen-
tencing decisions juries have made 174 and the contribution a sentence
makes to legitimate goals of punishment. 175 This section reviews these
factors and factors later decisions have employed to assess evolving stan-
dards of decency. The evidence indicates that under these factors and
165 154 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Neb. 1967).
166 Id,
167 534 N.W.2d 766 (Neb. 1995).
168 Id. at 777.
169 State v. Bjorklund, 604 N.W.2d 169, 217 (Neb. 2000).
170 State v. Mata, 668 N.W.2d 448, 478 (Neb. 2005).
171 Id.
172 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 575-77.
173 See, e.g. id. at 564-65; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 312.
174 Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 785, 788 (1979).
175 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379-80 (1989); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
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their application by the Supreme Court, evolving standards of decency
appear to forbid further use of electrocution.
A. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The war in Iraq and the War on Terror has, in some way, generated
publicity for the use of electricity as a torture device. As information
about the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal seeped into the media, one
photograph seemed to appear with nearly every article or broadcast on
Abu Ghraib's atrocities-a photograph of a prisoner standing on a card-
board box, his head in a black hood, and wires attached to each of his
hands.' 76 Still other prisoners were tortured with electrical wires at-
tached to their genitals. 177 Furthermore, although Abu Ghraib was a
source of torture stories to the media, word began to filter out from
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Afghanistan that American representatives
were employing electrical torture abroad. 178
While the war in Iraq dragged on and the search for weapons of
mass destruction appeared increasingly futile, the White House posted on
its official Web site a page entitled Tales of Saddam's Brutality, which
consists of quotations from major publications about the abuses and tor-
tures endured in Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein.1 79 Electrical
torture is one of the recurring themes.' 80 The depictions are truly horri-
ble, as they are intended to be, intending to prove the true inhumanity of
Saddam Hussein's regime. Given the international backlash over the
employment of even simulated electrocutions at Abu Ghraib1 8' and the
international condemnation for the use of electricity as punishment, it
seems abundantly clear that electrocution, judicially ordered or not, is not
regarded as permissible in a humane or beneficent society-or, appar-
ently, even in many that are malevolent and cruel.
176 http://www.beamish.org/images/AbuGhraib-electric.jpg.
177 LTG ANTHONY R. JONES, U.S. ARMY, at 15-16, INVESTIGATION OF THE Anu GHRAIB
PRISON AND THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (2004), http://www.army.mil./ocpa/
reports/ar 5-6/AR 15-6.pdf.
178 See Raymond Bonner, Detainee Says He Was Tortured in U.S. Custody, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2005 at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/13/intemational/middleeast/
13habib.html.
179 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/tales.html; see also Iraq: A Pop-
ulation Silenced; Silence Through Torture, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/silenced/
torture.htm.
180 Nineteen quotations refer to torture involving electricity. In comparison, only four
quotations refer to the poison gas used on the Kurds prior to the first Gulf War. See Tales,
supra note 179.
181 See e.g., John Hendren, The Conflict in Iraq; List of Detainee Death Inquiries Ex-
panded to 37; The Pentagon's higher figure for Iraq and Afghanistan includes at least eight
unresolved homicide cases that may have involved assaults, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2004., at A l;
Abuse Photos Enrage Arabs; 'Disgusted' Bush Vows Investigation After U.S. Guards Humili-
ate Prisoners, CALGARY SUN, May 1, 2004, at 22.
216 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:197
Iraq is not alone, however. The world's most oppressive regimes
frequently use electrical shock for interrogation or torture.182 One signif-
icant example is Turkey, which in 2004 faced at least six electrical tor-
ture cases in the European Court of Human Rights. 83 Similarly, the use
of electricity as a torture device, often resulting in death, appears on the
laundry list of offenses charged against Augusto Pinochet.184
B. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EVOLVING STANDARDS
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court have indicated a broader
reading of the Trop doctrine, indicating a lower threshold for establishing
that a punishment is unconstitutional, at least against certain offenders. 185
While the cases do not confront method-of-execution issues, the expan-
sion of Trop may nonetheless be significant for method-of-execution
challenges.
Perhaps most significant to the future of electrocution in the United
States is Atkins v. Virginia.18 6 Its affirmation of the principles of Trop v.
Dulles represents the most substantial elaboration of "evolving stan-
dards" demonstrated by the Supreme Court. Thirteen years earlier,
Penry v. Lynaugh18 7 raised the same issue. There the Court held that
retardation served as a mitigating factor but did not preclude executing
an offender who demonstrated proof of mental retardation.' 188
In Atkins, the Court referred to Harmelin v. Michigan,189 noting that
objective factors should be used to the extent that it is possible to deter-
mine excessiveness. It pinpointed, as in Penry, the legislatures of the
states as the "clearest and most reliable evidence of contemporary val-
ues."' 190 After noting the objective factors, however, the Court under-
scored its own discretion as a determinative factor.191 The Court
commented on the growing trend to abolish execution of the retarded: 192
"[ilt is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change."' 9 3 Because only five of the
182 See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831 (1996) (challenging Punjab
policemen's use of electrotorture on Sikhs).
183 See, e.g., Yaman v. Turkey, App. No. 32446/96 Eur. Ct: H.R. (2004); Ozkan v. Tur-
key, App. No. 21689/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004).
184 See Regina v. Evans, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 6 BHRC 24 (1999).
185 See supra, part I (discussing Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons).
186 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
187 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
188 See id. at 340 (1989).
189 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)).
190 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
191 See id. at 312-314.
192 See id. at 315 (counting at least twenty-one on-point bills that passed at least one
chamber of a state legislature)
193 Id.
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states that do not bar execution of the retarded have actually engaged in
it, the Court went on, "[it is] fair to say a national consensus has devel-
oped against it.' 194 Noting that there was no reason to disagree with the
state legislatures, given that executing the mentally retarded would not
likely achieve any retributive goals or serve as a deterrent, the Court held
that the "evolving standards of decency" Trop attributed to the Eighth
Amendment barred the execution of the retarded. 195
Although Atkins assessed the excessiveness of a punishment within
a narrow context, its application of Trop's evolving standards doctrine
and acknowledgment of legislative initatives has wider ramifications.
Although ten states still permit the electric chair,' 9 6 it is only available
upon the offender's affirmative election in six of those states,1 97 and is
only available as a statutory substitute for lethal injection in the event
that it is declared unconstitutional in three of those states. 198 Only Ne-
braska mandates its use in executions. The wholesale abandonment of
the electric chair has been rapid since the introduction of lethal injec-
tion.' 99 The numbers presented by the Court to demonstrate a shift in
public opinion in Atkins pale in comparison to the data regarding use of
the electric chair. Thus, the "clearest and most reliable evidence of con-
temporary values" shows virtual unanimity in opposition of electrocution
as a method of execution. The direction of the change is even more dra-
matic: no state has enacted electrocution as its method of execution since
West Virginia did so in 1949.200
Although Justice O'Connor had defected from the six-justice major-
ity in Atkins in Roper v. Simmons,20 the result in the latter case carried
significant overtones for the flexibility and, even to proponents, seem-
ingly arbitrary determination that ten generations of juvenile executions
were enough. The Court used the Trop doctrine, observing that twenty
194 Id. at 316.
195 See id. at 321.
196 See Methods of Execution, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arti-
cle.php?scid=8&did=245#s.tate (naming Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ne-
braska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia).
197 See CODE OF ALA. § 15-18-82(a) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 922.105 (2005); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 431.220 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-530 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
23-114 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (2005). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-101, n. 9
(specifically exempting the change from electrocution to lethal injection from a non-retroactiv-
ity provision).
198 Electrocution exists as a statutory substitute upon the invalidation of lethal injection in
Arkansas, Illinois, and Oklahoma. See A.C.A. § 5-4-617(b) (2005); 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (2005);
22 OrE. ST. § 1014(B) (2005).
199 See Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox
Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What it Says About Us, 63 OHIo
ST. L.J. 63, 82 (2002) (claiming that in 1949, twenty-six states used electrocution as their
default method of execution, but in 1973, twenty states used electrocution).
200 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 246.
201 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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states maintained both the death penalty and juvenile executions. 202 Be-
cause the "direction of change" was the same as in Atkins, this logic
could strike down any number of practices: hanging, firing squads, and
electrocution, all of which transcend the pale of Trop's comparatively
modest charge. Through statements like, "Petitioner cannot show na-
tional consensus in favor of capital punishment for juveniles but still re-
sists the conclusion that any consensus exists against it[,] ' 203 the Court
has effectively shifted the burden to the states not only to establish that
the practice does not entail excessive pain or suffering for the convicted
offender 204 but also to prove a negative, namely, that there exists no
growing consensus against such a punishment.
In addition to the evolving standards cases addressing the death pen-
alty, the Supreme Court has also introduced uncertainty to method-of-
execution questions in recent years, particularly in Nelson v. Camp-
bell.20 5 In Nelson, the Court held that the petitioner, a longtime intrave-
nous drug user facing lethal injection in Alabama, could challenge-
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-a "cut-down" procedure which the state al-
leged was necessary to reach his compromised veins.206 The unanimous
decision raises several problematic observations. First, if a procedure
necessary to execute one man is cruel and unusual, what recourse is there
for a death row inmate who, despite his other offenses, has bound him-
self to the laws regulating controlled substances? Secondly, while the
Court explicitly limits its holding to minimize the possibility of method-
of-execution claims,207 if a minor incision made under local anesthesia
might constitute a viable claim of cruel and unusual punishment, does
this show a trend towards new evolving standards of decency? When the
Court determined whether the lower courts' dismissal of Nelson's § 1983
action as a successive habeas petition was appropriate, it could easily
have found the dismissal constituted a harmless error, either because the
petitioner waived his right to select an alternative method of execution 20 8
or because the facts could not support the Eighth Amendment claim.
The Court confined itself to the case at hand and remanded it to the Fifth
Circuit for further proceedings, perhaps following the surprising adher-
ence to judicial conservatism seen in several significant 2004 cases.20 9
202 See id. at 564-65.
203 Id. at 567.
204 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
205 541 U.S. 637 (2004).
206 See id. at 641.
207 See id. at 644.
208 Cf Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001); Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663
(6th Cir. 2000); Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000) (each holding that challenges
to electrocution were irrelevant or barred since petitioners could have chosen lethal injection).
209 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (dismissing Pledge of
Allegiance case on standing grounds); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (hold-
2005] THE CHAIR, THE NEEDLE, AND THE DAMAGE DONE 219
Thus, what is most noteworthy in Nelson is what the Court does not
say, because it makes no use of Nelson's election by default to face lethal
injection rather than electrocution. 210 Although the circumstances of the
Sixth Circuit cases211 are slightly different, the decisions of both the state
of Alabama and the Supreme Court not to use this as a bar to petitioner's
claim indicate either a more searching analysis of Eighth Amendment
questions or a belief that a death row inmate cannot be expected to elect
electrocution.
Both Atkins and Roper involved comparably popular classes of pun-
ishment relative to electrocution.21 2 Legislative support for electrocution
has waned to the point that only death penalty abolitionists have kept it
in place in the only state where it is still the mandated method of execu-
tion.213 Over twenty-six years, even Nebraska's legislators have under-
taken significant action towards eliminating execution by electrocution.
Numerous bills have been introduced214 and the legislature has passed a
moratorium on executions. 215 In 1979, at the urging of Senator Ernie
Chambers, the unicameral legislature voted to eliminate the death pen-
alty, but then-Governor Charles Thone vetoed the bill.21 6 In 1998,
Chambers also led the fight to pass a moratorium on executions while the
legislature studied the death penalty, but then-Governor Mike Johanns
vetoed the measure. 217
C. FACTUAL CONCERNS
In addition to international factors and governmental action, the
electric chair faces questions of cruelty in large part because of the un-
certainty surrounding the method of execution and the assumptions upon
ing that Washington's mandatory sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional, despite their
near-verbatim similarity to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, while contending that the deci-
sion did not affect the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
210 The Court mentions that Nelson waived his right to elect electrocution, but makes no
further use of his choice. See id.
211 Discussed supra, Part H, §A.
212 At the time of Atkins, 19 states permitted execution of mentally retarded offenders.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15. When Roper was decided, 20 states permitted the execution of
juveniles. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-80.
213 See Death Penalty Changed in US State, BBC.coM, available at http:/I
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hilworld/americas/3594223.stm.
214 The initial action was taken by Kermit Brashear in 1999, see LB 52, 96th Leg., 1st
Spec. Sess. (Neb. 1999); Erin Dolan, State Execution Method Draws Fire, THE JOURNALIST,
available at http://journalism.unl.edu/joe/spring0O/040500/cover.htm; see also Provenzano v.
Moore, 744 So.2d 413, 450 (Fla. 1999).
215 See Nebraskans Against the Death Penalty, at http://nadp.inetnebr.com/about-
nadp.htm. (discussing 1998 moratorium).
216 See Dolan, supra note 214.
217 See id.
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which it was touted as a humane punishment. This section addresses the
issues of instantaneous and painless death.
The certainty of instantaneous death has been questioned since the
electric chair's invention.21 8 Given that a human being can survive being
struck by a lightning bolt that potentially carries a charge of 300,000
volts, 21 9 an electric chair designed to induce "instantaneous" death seems
destined to fail when operating at less than one percent of that voltage
and a lower amperage. 220
Indeed, the electric chair has failed to induce instantaneous death,
with condemned prisoners living for as long as seventeen minutes during
electrocutions. 22' Because doctors cannot check the body for signs of life
until after the electrocuted body has time to cool off to a temperature at
which a doctor can safely touch it222 it is nearly certain that excess elec-
tricity will be applied to the condemned to ensure death, thus leading to
charring, blistering, and melting.223 Furthermore:
[e]xperience proves that human beings vary enormously
in their powers of resistance to electrocution, which de-
pends upon the strength of current and not upon voltage
pressure: hence, several shocks may be required to pro-
duce what medical experts can reasonably define as
death, which means that doctors have to stand by with
stethoscopes at the ready to apply to the victim's chest
when he or she has been given one or more doses of
current.224
In comparison, heart monitors are employed in lethal injections 225
to actively determine whether a prisoner's heart has stopped. While more
poison may be administered to the prisoner than is absolutely vital, the
result will not be a significantly more tortured individual or mangled
corpse.
218 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 113.
219 See NASA, Human Voltage: What Happens When People and Lightning Converge,
http://science.nasa.gov/newhome/headlines/essdl8jun99_l.htm.
220 Compare id. with COMMITTEE, supra note 6.
221 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 244-257.
222 See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1091 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
cert).
223 See id. at 1088 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert); Dawson v. State, 554
S.E.2d 137, 141 (Ga. 2002)).
224 CHARLES DUFF, A HANDBOOK ON HANGING 119 (1974).
225 See San Quentin Institution Procedure No. 770 (procedures for carrying out an execu-
tion by lethal injection), available in part at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/EN-
GACT500011998?open&of=ENG-TWN.
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The discovery of the truly nauseating results of electrocution are
hardly new, as evidenced by the report of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Justice who witnessed the execution of Roger Haike in 1931:
Roger's head flew back and his body leaped forward
against the confining straps. Almost at once smoke
arose from his head and left wrist and was sucked up
into the ventilator overhead. The body churned against
the bonds, the lips ceased trembling and turned red, then
slowly changed to blue. Moisture appeared on the skin
and a sizzling noise was audible. The smell of burning
flesh grew heavy in the air.
Roger was being broiled...
... Then came the second jolt and again the body
surged against the restraining straps and smoke rose
from it. The visible flesh was turkey red.
Again the current slammed off and this time the
doctor stepped forward to listen, but he moved back
again and shook his head. Apparently Roger still clung
faintly to life.
The third charge struck him, and again the smoking
and sizzling and broiling. His flesh was swelling around
the straps.
The doctor listened carefully and raised his head.
"I pronounce this man dead," he said, folding up his
stethoscope. It was seven minutes after Roger had been
seated in the chair.226
Although the Haike execution provided anecdotal evidence for the
prolonged violent death many experienced in the electric chair, state pro-
tocols for executions underscore just how unlikely instantaneous death
really is, with many states having procedures administering electrical
shocks in up to four sets, and never for less than a 15 second period.227
The issue of painlessness has also been subject to dispute. Although
electrical torture at Abu Ghraib involves lower levels of voltage than
electrocution, 228 there is significant reason to doubt that the assumption
of a painless death in the electric chair is incorrect. In other words, if
one hundred volts constitutes torture, how does increasing it twentyfold
226 CURTIS BOK, STAR WORMWOOD 183-84 (1959).
227 See COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE-FL., A MONITOR: METHODS OF EXECUTION &
PROTOCOLS, IV. METHODS OF EXECUTION, available at http:lwww.fcc.state.fl.uslfcclreportsl
monitor/methmon.html.
228 See id; Sewell Chan, Marine Sergeant to Face Court-Martial in Abuse; Four
Charged in Case of Iraqi Prisoner Receiving Electric Shocks at Makeshift Detention Facility,
WASHINGTON POST, June 12, 2004, at A18.
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make it humane? The answer generally has been that the higher voltage
renders the electrocuted individual unconscious, 229 but given the un-
testability of the hypothesis and the extraordinary individual resistance to
electricity witnessed in electrocutions, 230 the conclusion is at least
questionable.
Judges who have sworn to uphold the Constitution, and thus, the
Eighth Amendment, can no longer assume that death in the electric chair
is instantaneous.23' Deaths have taken up to seventeen minutes and
many states even employed procedures using multiple jolts of electricity
from the outset, indicating that instantaneous death, if not unconscious-
ness, is a myth. 232 The factual assumptions accepted by courts prior to
Kemmler's execution ought to have no precedential value because they
were merely assumptions-at that time, no judicially-imposed electrocu-
tion had ever taken place. Now, with the hindsight of thousands of elec-
trocutions, some facts are now clear, including the disastrous
consequences that courts have failed to explain, such as those in the
Tafero execution. Furthermore, all indications are that condemned peo-
ple will inevitably face the more mundane, yet no less nauseating conse-
quences noted by witnesses and referred to in Justice Brennan's dissent
from denial of certiorari in Glass v. Louisiana.233
D. WHAT HURDLES REMAIN FOR A TROP-BASED CHALLENGE?
Two hurdles make a Supreme Court challenge to electrocution on
the basis of "evolving standards of decency" uncertain. The first is the
novelty of applying Trop v. Dulles in the method-of-execution context.
Although the circuits are in consensus that Trop applies to the methods
by which a sentence is implemented 234 rather than the sentence itself, the
Supreme Court has not engaged in method-of-execution analysis since
Trop was decided in 1958. A rigorous method-of-execution analysis re-
gime would appeal to death penalty opponents, because it could re-
present the opportunity to narrow the range of permissible execution
methods. Moreover, a move to method-of-execution analysis would also
return the Court to an approach more likely in line with the original in-
tent of the Eighth Amendment. 235 Although at least one state court has
229 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 113.
230 See id. at 251-52.
231 See, e.g., Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 141 (citing expert testimony that electro-
cution might not even produce instant unconsciousness, let alone death); BRANDON, supra note
34, at 244-257 (detailing botched or lengthy electrocutions).
232 See BRANDON, supra note 34 at 251-52.
233 See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1087-1094 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing complications and consequences of executions in the electric chair).
234 See supra Part II, §A.
235 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wilker-
son v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1879) ("Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the
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assumed that Trop caused the complete abandonment of method-of-exe-
cution analysis, 236 the Supreme Court has in fact only noted that Eighth
Amendment analysis is not confined to such assessments of whether a
method of execution is "barbarous. '237 Furthermore, although Justice
Scalia has urged that the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should
rely wholly upon original intent,2 38 this is emphatically not the law of the
United States unless and until Trop's standard is overruled.
If the standards of Trop applied, even under the AEDPA regime
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), litigants might be able to satisfy one of
the standards, showing that the lower court decision permitting the elec-
tric chair is contrary to Supreme Court precedent or that it was an unrea-
sonable application of the facts in the case. A petitioner could argue that
a court's decision to uphold the electric chair is an unreasonable applica-
tion of facts in light of Kemmler and Wilkerson v. Utah,239 given that
death is not instantaneous in many, if not all, electrocutions. The peti-
tioner could also argue that following Coker v. Georgia and Enmund v.
Florida, electrocution serves no legitimate penological interest due to the
availability of more humane and less mutilating forms of execution. Ad-
mittedly this is a narrow and risky argument; risky because Coker and
Enmund spoke of the punishment of death without regard for the method
of execution, but it is potentially persuasive when considered in combi-
nation with the nearly complete desertion of electrocution as a method of
execution.
Lastly, as a risky fallback option, a petitioner could always argue
for the support found in Atkins and Roper in legislative change and inter-
national standards. Because Atkins involved a direct appeal, the Court
did not have to apply the rigorous standard of 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)
which applies only to habeas corpus petitions. 2254(d)(1) requires a
habeas petitioner to establish that the lower courts rejected their claims in
a manner "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States." Similarly, Roper arose on an appeal from a so-called
"state habeas," thus avoiding the limitations of 2254(d)(1). Nonetheless,
a petitioner with nothing else to fall back on could do worse than to
argue that the Court's holdings have established baselines of in-
Constitution, but... the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty...
is not included in that category.").
236 See Trimble v. State, 487 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1984) ("[Tlhe Gregg plurality noted that the
Court had abandoned the early, more narrow approach of determining only whether any given
method of execution was torturous or barbarous.")
237 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
238 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 n.1 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239 99 U.S. 130, 136 (holding that punishments of torture are forbidden by the
Constitution).
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stantaneity and painlessness that one could not reasonably believe are
present in electrocutions.
Many state and circuit courts have been ready and willing to shield
themselves from method-of-execution issues by relying on precedent that
disposes of a petitioner's claim for reasons other than the merits 240 or
precedent that-while ostensibly on the merits-is factually un-
founded. 24' It is uncertain how long courts can continue to avoid this
issue through procedural bars and refusing to grant evidentiary hearings.
Compounding these deeply rooted flaws is the seeming ambivalence of
the courts toward the original intent behind the switch to electrocution-
a desire to replace hanging with a more "humane" extinguishment of
life. 242 If considering the shift to electrocution from a teleological stand-
point, it seems nearly certain that electrocution is no longer viable. Even
if an offender's death is painless and his loss of consciousness instanta-
neous, the mere connection of electrocution with the brutal regimes of
Iraq and Turkey and with the disgusting saga of Abu Ghraib casts a pall
on this method of execution. Nebraska's electric chair is a paradigmatic
case that demands the evolving standards of decency of Trop finally
sever the connection to these torturous regimes and put an end to the
strained use of Kemmler as blanket authority for all that can be hidden
under an impenetrable cloak of painlessness.
Nonetheless, a second concern remains because a judge who ex-
tends Trop to bar electrocutions would likely face significant political
attack. Given the response by some politicians, including Senator John
Cornyn (R-TX) and Representative Tom DeLay (R-TX), 24 3 who have
publicly chastised the Roper Court for its judicial activism, it is ques-
tionable whether five justices would gladly take more such rebukes for
effectively commuting the sentences of the ten men on Nebraska's death
row. Nonetheless, because current method-of-execution precedent is
largely ambiguous and thus poses a potential to endanger the validity of
sentences implicating other, more popular methods of execution, the
likely backlash would be mitigated somewhat.
Passage of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) and particularly § 2254(d)(1) may have restricted habeas chal-
lenges dramatically. 244 Case law favoring a broader interpretation of
240 See, e.g., Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333 (8th Cir 1997); Lindsey v. Smith , 820
F.2d 1137 (lth Cir. 1987).
241 See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
242 See id. at 243.
243 See Babington, supra note 20.
244 See Bryan Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 699, 702 (2002). But see John H. Blume,
AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91 CORNELL L. REv. 259, 297 (2006) ("[Bly the time
AEDPA's habeas 'reform' measures were enacted, there was very little habeas left.").
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Trop, however, has operated in the opposite direction to expand success-
ful habeas petitions beyond the nature of punishment and questions of
innocence. It has finally become more than a remote possibility for a
habeas petitioner to argue that, regardless of the existence of pain during
electrocutions-itself a heavily-debated question-evolving standards of
decency might bar the electric chair.
CONCLUSION
The case has never been stronger for the abolition of the electric
chair with the factual assumptions of Kemmler now undermined by over
a century of experience with the electric chair, especially when analyzed
under the "mere extinguishment of life" standard apparently adopted in
Kemmler merged with the two standards of Trop. When compared to its
intent, the charring, potentially torturous death, the fears it inspires, 245
and the association with agonizing vengeance which it has been given by
some,2 46 the electric chair cannot pass a test of constitutional rigor. It
has been readily abandoned and has fallen from the predominant form of
execution in the United States to a few scattered relics. Its use has be-
come truly unusual.
Furthermore, after Roper and Atkins, the standards for determining
whether a punishment falls outside the realm of decency are more flexi-
ble than ever. Even without the swing vote of Justice O'Connor that
added the sixth vote in Atkins, it is plausible that Justice Kennedy might,
as in Roper, join with Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer to
eliminate the last bastion of electrocution.
Unlike the Supreme Courts of Georgia and Florida, Nebraska's Su-
preme Court has shown no willingness to cede even the possibility that
electrocution might constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
state constitution.247 Because any challenge to Nebraska's use of elec-
trocution would in effect challenge the validity of the condemned man's
death sentence, it is unlikely that Nelson v. Campbell would permit a
§ 1983 suit to be brought against the electric chair.248 The state execution
245 See Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 2002); Conner v. State, 982
S.W.2d 655 (Ark. 1998) (noting that police used the threat of the electric chair to "persuade"
individuals into confessing).
246 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 2 (quoting former Florida Attorney General Bob
Butterworth, "People who wish to commit murder, they better not do it in the state of Florida
because we have a problem with our electric chair.").
247 See discussion supra, Part II, §C.
248 Compare Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 ("We need not reach here the diffi-
cult question of how to categorize method-of-execution claims generally.") with Spivey v.
State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 279 F.3d 1301, 1302 (1 1th Cir. 2002) and Williams v.
Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1997) and In re Sapp, 118 F.3d 460, 461 (finding that
§ 1983 actions challenging circumstances or method of execution constituted successive
habeas petition).
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protocol might still be challenged on the ground that fifteen seconds 249 is
not "instantaneous" as the Kemmler case had presupposed, but, given
that executions have not been instantaneous in the last 115 years, such a
challenge would likely fail. Following Nelson, it is probable that this suit
could only be made in a habeas petition; any failure to make the claim in
a habeas petition would likely bar it later.250 Thus, habeas is the only
likely route to relief for inmates who have exhausted their appeals.
The path to a writ of habeas corpus, however, is hardly less tumultu-
ous. 251 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
provides a new challenge for habeas petitioners, nearly foreclosing re-
view of method-of-execution cases by erecting a virtually complete bar
to "evolving standards of decency," unless those standards are, in fact,
already federal law. 252 Conveniently, however, federal law has main-
tained certain baselines while simply ignoring facts or assuming them as
an essential part of maintaining the electrocution regime. The precedent
supporting the electric chair over the last 115 years could even, with
some hyperbole, be characterized as "indisputably meritless. '25 3
Furthermore, if considering the "dignity of man" approach offered
in Trop, there are additional reasons to perceive electrocution as a cruel
punishment. The fiery electrocutions of Jesse Tafero and Pedro Medina
and the bloody death of Allen Lee "Tiny" Davis are all proof of truly
dehumanizing punishment. Compounding these with the "death
mask,"254 the loss of organ function leading to defecation 255 or ejacula-
tion256 during the electrocution, and the uncertainty of immediate death,
there is significant evidence that the electric chair represents a punish-
ment far more undignified than is necessary for the "mere extinguish-
ment of life."
The time to eliminate the electric chair has long passed, yet courts
have deferred and deferred despite the lack of any substantive precedent
on the issue until the state legislatures rendered the issue moot. While,
the Eighth Amendment enters what may be its most critical juncture, as
249 See Death Penalty Changed in US State, BBC.coM, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/3594223.stm. (noting Nebraska's change to a one-jolt, fif-
teen-second application of electricity in its execution protocol).
250 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) ("The [adequate state ground] doc-
trine applies to bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner's federal
claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement.").
251 See Stevenson, supra note 244, at 702-03 (discussing ways AEDPA "dramatically
altered" federal habeas corpus practice to the detriment of habeas petitioners).
252 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
253 The phrase is used in Williams v. Hopkins, 983 F.Supp 891, 894 (D. Neb 1997)
(describing the claim that electrocution is cruel and unusual as frivolous and based upon an
"indisputably meritless" theory).
254 Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1087 n. 13.
255 See id. at 1087 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 179.
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rumors of innocent people being executed 257 and uncertainty about capi-
tal convictions arise, 25 8 it is vital that the Eighth Amendment not become
a mere truism that in forms of execution, no matter how apparently bru-
tal, "all is retained which has not been surrendered. '259 Although there
may indeed be a humane form of execution, the evidence is more than
sufficient to show that it is not electrocution. For the sake of our consti-
tutional principles, the courts must not gamble on a probability that Hor-
ace Dunkins260 or William Vandiver 261 were rendered unconscious prior
to being electrocuted.
Prisoners on Nebraska's death row have no choice, because Ne-
braska law expressly prohibits their execution by any form but electrocu-
tion. 262 In contrast, the proponents of capital punishment have an option,
not to merely support lethal injection as a preferred method of execution,
but to ensure that the electric chair is eliminated so that states may gain a
substantial meaning of what the Eighth Amendment does and does not
permit in the execution of the ultimate punishment. Although some case
law exists that has addressed lethal injection's viability as a method of
execution under the Eighth Amendment, it is nearly as fragile as the
Kemmler decision and its offspring.263 While the public may have mixed
feelings about the death penalty, 264 at least the most public proponents of
electrocution-those who surround prisons at the time of execu-
tions2 65-seem to be in total agreement with defense experts' assess-
ments266 that the electric chair is an extremely painful form of death.
257 See, e.g., Editorial: Clemency and Justice, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 30, 2005, at 12A.
258 Christina Bellantoni and Keyonna Summers, Warner Commutes Death Sentence; De-
struction of DNA Evidence Cited, THE WASH. TIMES,, Nov. 30, 2005, at B01; Frank Green,
DNA Test Talks Proceed in Coleman Case; the Exam Could Prove an Executed Inmate's Guilt
or Innocence, RICHMOND (VA.) TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 2005, at B-4.
259 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (referring to the Tenth Amendment).
260 It took the State of Alabama two jolts of electricity, nine minutes apart, to kill Dunkins
in the electric chair. See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 252.
261 Vandiver's execution by the State of Indiana required five jolts of electricity and took
a total of seventeen minutes. See id. at 251.
262 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2532 (2004).
263 See, e.g., Woolls v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1995); Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d
1227 (4th Cir. 1995) (barring challenge on procedural grounds).
264 A recent Gallup poll has shown that 64 percent of people support the death penalty as
an available punishment for murders, down from 80 percent in 1994. See America to Execute
1,000th Prisoner, BIRMINGHAM (U.K.) POST, Nov. 30, 2005, at 8.
265 See BRANDON, supra note 34, at 252 (describing the chants and signs of those gathered
around Florida's death row at the time of Ted Bundy's execution).
266 See, e.g., John Allen, Wisconsin Week, Emeritus Engineering Professor Pulls Plug on
Electric Chair's Reliability, available at http://www.news.wisc.edu/6648.html; Donald D.
Price, Pain in the Electric Chair, available at http://www.ampainsoc.org/pub/buletin/sep02/
poli 1.htm.
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Furthermore, while Supreme Court rules are not necessarily retroac-
tive,267 it is an unlikely strain to pull methods of execution into the "pro-
cedural" category of Duncan v. Louisiana.2 68 In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that a ruling that places a punishment off-limits for certain
offenders or changes the state's ability to bar certain primary conduct
would be wholly retroactive for petitioners on collateral review. 269 This
conclusion combined with the complete retroactivity witnessed in
Furman v. Georgia270 indicate a significant likelihood that barring a cer-
tain method of execution would necessarily be retroactive. Thus, a ruling
that lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment would
likely result in the commutation of hundreds, or even thousands, of death
sentences in the United States, 27' excepting only those states that pre-
serve alternate methods of execution. 272 On the other hand, prohibiting
electrocution would result in the commutation of only ten death
sentences. 273
The electric chair has become infamous for its disastrous malfunc-
tions. Its most significant malfunction, however, is more horrific than
the executions of Jesse Tafero or Horace Dunkins-it is the malfunction
of a judicial system designed to vigorously protect the rights of the politi-
cally powerless and even the profoundly guilty. The value of generally
applicable constitutional rights ought not be determined by something so
variable as the electrical resistance of a condemned individual.274
It may only have taken forty seconds for Jose Sandoval, Jorge
Galindo, and Erick Vela to kill five people. The electric chair, if work-
ing properly, might not even take that long to kill any one of them. But
for the Eighth Amendment to mean what it says, it must command that
any punishment generating grossly excessive violence and carrying un-
resolved concerns as a punishment is constitutionally impermissible and
recognize that its horror does not serve its purported purpose.275 The
267 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
268 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
269 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 330.
270 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
271 Executions, Death Sentences Down in 2004, Cm. TRIBUNE, November 14, 2005, at 6
(noting that 3,315 people were on death rows around the United States in 2004).
272 See supra note 197.
273 DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, STATE By STATE INFORMATION: NEBRASKA,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state/. In comparison, 649 people are currently on death row
in California. See Aimee Green, Staying Alive on Death Row, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 5,
2006, at BI.
274 Cf. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) ("Humane considerations
and constitutional requirements 'are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar consid-
erations or by the thickness of the prisoner's clothing.").
275 See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 ("The cruelty against
which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punish-
ment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life hu-
2005] THE CHAIR, THE NEEDLE, AND THE DAMAGE DONE
Supreme Court has recognized one overriding principle as far back as In
re Kemmler and Wilkerson v. Utah276-the death penalty, even if consti-
tutionally permissible, must not be a celebration of horrific violence and
revenge. It is supposed to be the "mere extinguishment of life[;] ' 2 7 7 it is
not, and must not be, a circus. 278
manely."); Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915) ("The constitutional inhibition
of ex post facto laws was ... not [intended] to obstruct mere alteration in conditions deemed
necessary for the orderly infliction of humane punishment.").
276 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
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278 Jones v. Butterworth, 701 So.2d 76, 87 (Fla. 1997) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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